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Fabio Andres Diaz 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Reflecting on methodology means thinking about decisions a researcher makes when 
approaching the subject of study, in terms of questions posed, concepts embraced and choice of 
methods. There are also epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying the selection of 
particular methodologies and concepts, though this is less often explicitly considered. Therefore 
within these considerations, the definition of the unit of analysis and the levels at which the study 
is conducted, need to be made explicit and to be justified, for quality in research. This chapter 
discusses these issues taking the example of Colombia, to show how some violent conflicts fall 
between the cracks of currently dominant methodologies of mathematical modeling and the use 
of existing econometric datasets, on the one hand, and the ways ethnicity is included in those 
models and datasets. Ethnic identities have mostly been the focus of studies by anthropologists, 
often focused on local level struggle sand claims, whereas a national level perspective is still 
most common in the econometric rational choice approach to conflict studies. The later however 
use ethnicity as one of its variables. My point is that research results also change when the 
research focus changes from national to local level. 
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Introduction  
 
In this chapter I take the case of the El Cauca district in Colombia, and indigenous people’s use 
of violence in the conflicts over rights. I ask: why is this conflict largely invisible in the studies 
of long-lasting Colombian violence? Not only is this a puzzling and intriguing question, but, I 
believe, it has wider implications for how we work in conflict studies in relation to questions of 
data, identity and levels of analysis within the “global village”.   
 
To answer the above question, I analyze how is the dynamics of violence at the national and 
local level understood by scholars working on Colombian conflict. Much research in the 
Colombian conflict has applied econometric mathematical models, and I evaluate the influence 
of this methodological approach to the choice of the unit of analysis. But I also question the use 
of the category of ethnicity (at the expense of all other identities) in those quantitative studies, 
evaluating its presence at the national and local level.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. I first reflect on the use of mathematical models for assessing 
conflict and civil war, testing a possibility that there may have been an “ethnic war” in 
Colombia. I then examine how the narratives about Colombian conflict that are constructed at 
national level differ from regional level narratives, and how such differences arise. Finally, I 
reflect at the relevance of the unit of analysis effect in the scholarly interpretations of “civil war” 
and “ethnic conflict”.  
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In search of a unit(y) of analysis 
 
The main claim of this chapter is that selection of particular units of analysis in relationship to 
the level at which the study focuses, will tend to create biases for what we can and will 
“observe”, and thus will influence the findings of our studies. Those findings particularly relate 
to a question whether a conflict will be defined as “ethnic” and how will local identities be 
related to econometric datasets and models. This point is illustrated through an analysis of how 
mathematical economic models and datasets are used to research violent conflict in Colombia. 
As an unknown observer put it: ‘If you torture the data long enough, it will confess to anything.’   
 
Mathematical modeling of social phenomena has, by definition, always implied abstraction and 
simplification to allow for a focus on the specific relationships we want to study.
1
 In this case, 
the equations used in order to understand interactions between other abstract categories such as 
“ethnicity” and “conflict” are further represented by the interactions between a given set of 
variables, for example the state, the gross domestic product, the presence of natural resources, 
the amount of people belonging to different ethnic groups (often measured through religion and 
language differences).
2
 
 
While some of the variables used in studies on “ethnic conflict” are widely shared among 
scholars, many – and the question of their selection for a particular context – are still a matter of 
fierce dispute. As some authors note, mathematical modeling shows correlations through the 
interactions or equations between different categories and variables, but cannot actually prove 
causal relations.
3
  Similarly, part of the problem with the study of ethnicity is the difficulty of 
analyzing how it relates to the general category of war or violent conflict. Almost any conflict 
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can be assumed or asserted to be related to the identity of affected groups residing in conflict 
areas
4
. However, while ethnicity and identity can be used as analytical categories to understand 
the dynamics, especially of the local-level conflicts, this does not mean that ethnicity and identity 
cause conflict.  
 
Most analyses on ethnic conflict embrace a state-centered approach, so that variables used to 
understand conflict through identifying correlations, are usually analyzed at national level only, 
and not at both regional and national levels.
5
 In other words, few of those approaches bear in 
mind that the modelling process sometimes takes for granted the leap of faith between concepts 
or variables we study and realities on the ground, as it were.   
 
Can the state be equated, even roughly, with gross domestic product? Are formal voting rights a 
good measure of effective political freedoms of citizens? Probably not, and yet some economists 
still employ such assumptions when conducting their empirical work. That such rough and ready 
approximations are commonly used reflects the reliance of mathematical research on data 
sources and datasets (see de Sousa’s chapter in this volume on datasets used in conflict and peace 
studies). The same is relevant for understanding the realities of ethnicities: how are ethnic groups 
and their political positions created, how are they mobilized and what therefore comes to be 
termed as an “ethnic conflict”, by the communities themselves, by political elites, or by the 
researchers, is all linked to specific understanding of what “ethnicity” means. In much conflict 
and peace literature, ethnicity is treated as if it were a bounded, self-activating social entity, a 
group with fixed, defined boundaries and membership.
6
 At the same time, different variables are 
used to mark ethnicities in datasets. In some cases, data is drawn from scanned versions of 
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existing maps that claim to show the spatial distribution of “ethnic groups”, such as the Atlas 
Narodov Mira
7
, or geo-referenced datasets.
8
  Datasets based on political representation of “ethnic 
groups” and the allocation of power and resources to these groups, are also used to measure the 
polarization within the countries.
9
  
 
In order to be able to compare and analyze “patterns” and “regularities” in social processes upon 
which the aggregate datasets rest, these datasets need to offer roughly comparable information 
from different countries, so that trends can be established or tested in relation to the variables 
under scrutiny. Several problems emerge, however, when information from different countries is 
compared and aggregated. First, the assumption of relative homogeneity, i.e. that social 
mechanisms operate in roughly similar ways in different contexts, and that data measured will 
generally mean something similar in each national setting, is not necessarily justified. Second, 
aggregated studies also conceal a great deal of local-level variation in terms of inter- and intra-
group inequalities.
10
 Finally, for researchers who wish to understand what might be happening in 
a specific locality, aggregate studies are weak at indicating the possible correlation between 
ethnicity, inequalities and violent conflict.
11
  Methodologically, spending so much effort and 
time on trying to “prove” or “disprove” highly generalized hypotheses or working theories, 
makes little sense, especially when the data disguise many of the distinctive qualities of differing 
contexts.
12
 
 
This is especially relevant for the national-level data. For example, regarding Colombia, existing 
datasets such as the MAproject
13
, or the GeoEPR-ETH Version 2.0 dataset
14
 consider indigenous 
people in Colombia as part of a homogenous group at national level. Yet within Colombia, there 
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are more than 100 different indigenous groups, living in different regions of the country under 
widely varied circumstances, with some common experiences, perhaps, of social exclusion and 
inclusion, but of very different kinds. Some datasets such as the Uppsala
15 
and PRIO
16
 do not 
even acknowledge the presence and experience of different armed groups within local 
indigenous regions of Colombia, such as the Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (Quintin Lame 
Armed Movement; in further text MAQL). To avoid the pitfalls of national-level aggregated 
datasets some research on violent conflict has moved away from gross national data towards data 
gathered at regional and local levels. With such data, researchers are far better able to assess the 
particularities of a conflict within a specific geographical area, including from an “ethnic” 
perspective.
17
 Furthermore, even within the rational choice approaches, researchers are ever 
more aware that violent conflicts are always historically and political rooted, and are paying 
more attention to the ways history and politics play out at the local levels.
18
  I turn now to 
examine the issues about the unit and the level of the analysis on the specific example of 
research on Colombian violent conflict.  
 
Does Colombia have “Ethnic Conflict”?  
 
Taking the case of Colombia and examining it in relation to ‘ethnic conflict’ is going against the 
grain of almost everything written about the violence in the country.  This is precisely why I 
decided to undertake this exercise: in order to test out to what extent our analytical tools can 
result in blinding us certain aspects of the local and perhaps national realities of a particular 
conflict or set of conflicts. The Colombian case also offers the possibility of making a fairly clear 
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distinction between different conflicts – and the units of their analysis – for national and for 
regional and local levels. 
 
Traditionally, in conflict studies, the Colombian conflict has been considered a classic guerrilla 
war against the state and paramilitary, based at least originally on political ideologies.
19
 Rebels 
were seen as fighting in an effort to secure eventual control of the state apparatus
20
  and in some 
cases to control local institutions of the state and the economy.
21
 The history of the Colombian 
conflict and its emergence has also been traced to the impact of colonialism, even though 
independence was achieved in 1819.
 22
  What followed was a century of small civil wars, mainly 
fought between liberals and conservatives disputing the consolidation of political, economic and 
state power within the country.
23
 These tensions and the violence continued up to the middle of 
the 20
th
 century, more or less continuously. Throughout this time, violence was mainly used as 
part of a wider political platform, to help consolidate power, and secure land ownership across 
the country.
24
 The boundaries of legality and illegality in the uses of violence, and in general, 
were blurred and demarcated during such violent political struggles.  
 
Literature on Colombian conflict often gives salience to one particularly violent episode of the 
twentieth century – the events that occurred between 1948-1953 - which are labelled La 
Violencia.  In these episodes, almost 2 per cent of the country’s population died when violence 
followed the assassination of liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan.
25
 The practices and logics of 
violence used in La Violencia obeyed forms of violence used more than fifty years earlier, when 
armed violence was used against members of political opposition parties who could be 
threatened, murdered and displaced to different regions of the country, on the basis of their 
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political beliefs.
26
 The eventual bloodbath resulted from the extended use of violence by the 
authorities, and produced a deep lack of trust in state institutions among significant sectors of the 
Colombian population.
27
  
 
During the period 1953 to 1958, immediately after La Violencia, some guerrilla groups 
demobilized. By 1958 an agreement was reached among Colombian elites that political power 
would alternate between liberals and conservatives. Elite capture of the political system thus shut 
down political options for new political groupings and parties.
 28
  This inter-elite agreement 
partly explains why leftist guerrilla groups emerged during the 60s and 70s, mainly: the FARC
29
 
the ELN
30
 and the EPL.
31
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the appearance of drug trafficking altered the 
relationships of power at national and regional levels, creating spaces for illegal entrepreneurs, 
right-wing paramilitaries, armed factions that worked for drug barons, and private armies known 
as self-defence forces.
32
Drug trafficking further complicated the panorama of the Colombian 
civil conflict, and led to the coexistence of several simultaneous and interwoven forms of 
political, economic and social violence. During this period, another armed group, the M19, also 
emerged.
 33
   Following election of President Turbay in 1978, violence became the deliberate 
strategy of government, used against guerrilla forces, and not against right wing militias, private 
armies or paramilitaries. The subsequent activities of the Colombian security apparatus meant 
increased militarization, and massive human right abuses including the use of torture, and 
disappearances.
34
 
 
During the 1980s, the state made fresh attempts to reach a peace agreement with guerrilla forces, 
but encountered widespread opposition to the peace process from right-wing and paramilitary 
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groups, now fully involved in paramilitarism and drug trafficking.
35
 In the same decade small, 
regionally based guerrilla groups emerged, which did not achieve national influence, but could 
be significant players at local level. The MAQL is one of these smaller guerilla groups that 
emerged as an expression of regional grievances. At local level, armed mobilization looked like a 
valid option in the face of widespread repression, paramilitary atrocities and a lack of protective 
state presence. Towards the end of the 1990s, within the context of constitutional reforms, the 
situation became more promising for peace and security, and there followed the demobilization 
of the M19, the EPL and the MAQL.  
 
From 1991 to 1994 the government sought to defeat groups perceived as not committed to peace. 
Despite these efforts, results were limited, as drug traffickers were gaining the upper hand, even 
after the death of drug baron Pablo Escobar and the reclusion of leaders from other cartels. 
During the 1990s, the FARC and paramilitaries both engaged in kidnapping and drug-related 
activities to increase their revenue. The almost total lack of formal state presence in some areas 
of the country made it possible for these groups to increase their military power and effectively 
they came to replace the state at local level.
36
 
 
Finally, after further peace initiatives failed in the late 1990s, from 2002 to 2010 the Colombian 
government pursued a policy of all-out war against left-wing militant groups, weakening the 
FARC and killing some of its top leaders.
37
 According to the government, paramilitaries no 
longer existed after the 2003 peace accord of Ralito.
38
  Those armed groups that emerged or 
survived after this point, although they adopted very similar violent practices to the 
paramilitaries, came to be known as criminal gangs or “BACRIM” instead. Guerrillas also 
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changed their strategy during this period, and started to use particular provinces of Colombia as 
“safe havens” so as to withstand the government’s military offensive. One of these provinces 
was the department of El Cauca.  Before reflecting in more detail on whether and how “ethnic 
conflict” can apply to the El Cauca case, I first examine how quantitative mathematical 
modelling has been used to try to understand the national-level processes discussed so far. 
  
Most economic literature on the Colombian conflict that uses mathematical models has 
researched the conflict in relation to quite specific research questions. They seek, for example, to 
explain the presence, or not, of armed groups in different regions
39
, the impact of internal violent 
conflicts on the national economy
40
, the relations between paramilitary groups emerging and 
natural resources
41
, why teenagers and children join armed groups
42
, links between governability 
and conflict
43
, differences between war and criminality
44
, relations between violent conflict and 
the state
45
,  and finally the role of drug trafficking in influencing violence in the conflict.
46
 
Elements such as class, poverty and marginalization of citizens have all been referred to, and 
sometimes used as elements to understand the presence or absence of armed groups, or the 
incidence of violence in conjunction with other political and historical features.
47
  But in none of 
these studies have identity or ethnicity been addressed as issues that cause conflict, and in very 
few is identity seen as one of the elements for explanations of the emergence of conflict. I could 
find only two studies about the MAQL group in terms of its relationship with particular 
indigenous groups in Colombia
48
 and in El Cauca province.
49
 In all of them the unit of analysis is 
either the individual actor or the armed group; it is never an “ethnic group” or “identity group”. 
The issue of identity groups or ethnic groups is raised within studies on Colombia mostly to help 
in analyzing the impact of the (national) conflict at the local level.
50
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From this brief review of relevant literature, one could conclude that ethnicity and identity issues 
have mostly been seen by researchers as irrelevant to causes of violent conflict in Colombia. Or 
one could conclude that although ethnic and other identity-based groups exist in Colombia, they 
are not seen salient to violent conflict because of their relatively small share of the population, 
and thus are likely to be overlooked.  After all, historians, political scientists and anthropologists 
do study ethnicity and ethnic identity in Colombia. They do not use mathematical models based 
on quantitative datasets for doing so, however. Rather, they develop analyses within the wider 
historical and political contexts of specific regions of the country, and overall at national level.
51
   
 
Narratives of conflict and the meanings of ethnicity: El Cauca province 
 
El Cauca province is located in the South West of Colombia and has around a million and a half 
inhabitants, as well as a long history both of struggles for indigenous rights and the presence of 
armed groups.  In municipalities where violent conflict has been prevalent in El Cauca, 35.7% of 
the population recognized themselves as indigenous and 54.2% as afro-descendent in the early 
2000s.
52
 In addition, an estimated one fifth (21 per cent) of the total indigenous population of 
Colombia is concentrated in 14 of the 41 municipalities of El Cauca.
53
  Table 13.1 shows that in 
El Cauca the indigenous population is comprised of six different ethnic groups with different 
traditions, cultures and languages. 
 
This suggests that, at the level of local and regional politics, “ethnic” agendas may well emerge 
and become salient elements for understanding local political dynamics in relation to wider 
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country-level conflicts. La Cauca province was where the first indigenous guerrilla group in 
Colombia emerged – the aforementioned MAQL.54 And not coincidentally, it is also a district 
where the indigenous population has constantly been on the receiving end of violence from 
paramilitaries, guerrillas and government forces alike.
55
 In recent years the region has become 
strategically important for the FARC, faced with the government offensive of 2002-2010 against 
left wing guerrilla movements. Indeed, La Cauca is an area known for the presence of a 
relatively large number of armed groups, over the course of the years.
56
 The FARC conducted its 
first military operations in the province as early as 1961, for example
57
, even before it was 
recognized nationally as an armed group.  Other groups made their presence visible in the 
province – including M19 - which used the province as one of its main bases during the peace 
negotiations with the government in the 1980s. Historically, these armed groups have not been 
associated with indigenous struggles, except for the case of the MAQL.   
 
My question therefore is this: can the case of the MAQL armed struggle be seen as “ethnic 
conflict”, with its own dynamics of identity-based violence within La Cauca? This question can 
be derived from the way that the Colombian government speaks of “indigenous groups” as 
“ethnic minorities”, and at the same time recognizes different ethnic groups within the broad 
category of “indigenous” or “afro-descendants”.58 It is also significant that the MAQL itself 
defined its own political agenda around indigenous people’s rights.  
  
The dispersion and separation of indigenous groups across the Colombian territory and their vast 
distances from big population centres make them less visible than they might otherwise be. It 
some studies of the Colombian conflict, it is also argued that defining and perceiving boundaries 
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between indigenous and non-indigenous Colombians is quite problematic.
 59
  The indigenous 
population stands at around two per cent of the total national population of the country, 
illustrating the extent of genocide in the past, and the wholesale destruction of indigenous groups 
in the country through centuries of colonisation. Recognition and definition of indigenous people 
as a group (or as many groups) was largely absent before the Constitution of 1991. Under the 
provisions of this document, indigenous people for the first time acquired particular legal and 
political recognition rights, which allowed them more participation and involvement in the 
Colombian state and in politics.
60
 However, although the term “ethnic groups” is used in 
discussions about indigenous rights in Colombia, in most of the academic literature, the term is 
simply not referred to at all.  Rather, the terms “indigenous groups” or “indigenous minorities” 
are used. Might it be the case that in Colombia, and even in Latin-America, unlike in Africa and 
Asia, for example, minorities’ identities are not framed as ethnic, but rather as indigenous or 
non-indigenous?
61
   
 
It is interesting to note that indigenous struggles in Colombia have ‘moved from class-based 
claims to a politics where identity claims have been central in their agenda and part of their 
strategies to negotiate with the state’, partly as a result of the constitutional changes of 1991.62 If 
this is the case, why is it that the violent manifestations of indigenous people’s struggles are not 
defined as “ethnic conflict”? I find this fascinating and also puzzling; it certainly has wider 
implications for how we work comparatively in conflict studies in relation to identity-based 
conflicts, across the “global village”.   
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Historians have offered a broad account of violence and resistance of indigenous populations in 
La Cauca province, showing the roots of the current conflict in the area even before the 
appearance of the FARC guerrillas in the early 1960s. Historically, indigenous claims for self-
determination – rather than independence - and for respect for indigenous rights date back to at 
least the early years of the 20
th
 century, with the uprising of 1916-1919 led by indigenous leader 
Quintín Lame.
63
 Despite the failure of the uprising in achieving its goals, it set a historical 
precedent and became a reference point for later indigenous resistance and political struggles. 
Indigenous claims were almost always informed by legal claims for land and for the right to land 
that had belonged to indigenous communities for centuries, and which had been taken over, 
illegally purchased or invaded and usurped by colonizers and landowners.  
 
Another milestone for those struggles was the formation of the CRIC (Regional Indigenous 
Council of the Cauca; Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca) in 1971, a political organization 
aiming at bringing together and combining different indigenous groups within the province. The 
emergence of the CRIC marked the relative independence of indigenous political organizations 
from the main Colombian political parties and groupings.
64
 The CRIC struggled for cultural and 
territorial autonomy and human rights of the indigenous groups as well as for the recovery of 
what it viewed as stolen indigenous lands. Such claims were framed through notions of territory, 
tradition and customs, and could therefore be understood as identity-based or “ethnic” claims. 65   
 
The MAQL, which can be termed an indigenous guerrilla group, operated in El Cauca between 
the mid-1980s and the beginning of 1990s, and claimed to defend the indigenous communities in 
the province from attacks by landowners, other guerrilla movements, the state military, and other 
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armed groups in the area. MAQL also aimed to struggle for the retaking and the return of 
territories previously seized and stolen from indigenous communities, by landowners in the 
region. The group was named after indigenous leader Quintin Lame, and like its namesake, did 
not make separatist claims for independence from Colombia. MAQL’s period of armed struggle 
lasted till the late 1980s, and in 1991 MAQL demobilized as part of broader negotiations with 
guerrilla movements, a process that resulted in the country gaining a new Constitution. As 
already noted, this gave more rights to indigenous people, and a seat in the Senate. In principle, 
the Constitution granted them the right to “self-determination” as a minority, however vaguely 
these terms were defined.
66
 
  
The demobilization of the MAQL did not end violence in El Cauca province. The region 
remained a strategic corridor for illicit trafficking of drugs and weapons
67
, and other armed 
groups such as paramilitaries and guerrillas maintained their presence in the area. Clashes 
between armed groups in El Cauca between 1988 and 2009 are estimated to represent around six 
per cent of all armed clashes in the Colombian conflict at that time; the province had five per 
cent of all estimated battle deaths during this same period.
68
 
 
Moreover, the mobilization of indigenous groups along identity-based or “ethnic” lines around 
collective claims did not come to an end after 1991.  Instead, it was transformed from a violent to 
a peaceful movement, after demobilization of MAQL. Marches of 2008, led by the CRIC, were 
organized to express grievances of the indigenous people around land, human rights abuses and 
what they saw as the destructive social and economic policies of the government at national 
level, especially in the signing of a free trade agreement with the United States.
69
 Between 
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20,000 and 50,000 indigenous people were mobilized in the march from the west of the country 
to the capital Bogota, around 590 kilometres away.  Demands included dismantling of legal 
measures removing land of indigenous communities, and official recognition of the deaths of at 
least 1.253 indigenous people between 2002 and 2007 alone, as well as 54.000 displaced 
indigenous people within El Cauca province.
70
 The marchers opposed Colombian government 
plans to allow US military bases in the country.
71
 They were also responding to the impact of 
mining and industrial projects, and the presence of armed actors across their territories.
72
 Thus 
the agenda of the march comprised elements related to both national and regional issues and 
grievances, most of them connected with a strong identity-based or “ethnic” set of claims, 
expressed through what can be seen as “ethnic” political mobilisation. It would seem to be an 
excellent case study to look at ethnic basis, not only of conflict and violence, but also of moves 
towards peace, initially “negative” peace, implying the end of violence, and proposals for more 
“positive” peace in the future.   
 
Towards a Conclusion – but no Closure  
 
The question I return to now is how, and to what degree the levels of abstraction of mathematical 
models, the nature of the data, and the unit and the level of analysis help or hinder our 
understanding of indigenous groups in Colombia and their armed struggle with the MAQL as an 
example of “ethnic conflict”. Clearly, there was an armed conflict: violence was used, people 
were killed, and the state and specific, identity-based population groups were involved. Could we 
use here use a “civil war” framework to test to what extent “ethnic” identity was involved?  
Surprisingly, perhaps, it seems not, as the conflict in Colombia does not appear in the recognized 
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databases on civil war and conflict such as the PRIO
73
 or UCDP.
74
 The Minorities at Risk 
(MAR
75
) database lists “indigenous peoples” as being at risk in Colombia, and defines them as 
“conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity with 
traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply distinct from those of 
dominant groups”.76 Interestingly, the other at risk group in Colombia listed in the MAR is 
“Blacks”, who surprisingly are defined sui generis as an “ethnoclass”, as ‘…ethnically or 
culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from slaves or immigrants, most of whom occupy 
a distinct social and economic stratum or niche’.77 So perhaps, this shows that ethnic identity 
markers are recognised in the Colombian conflict in some respects (those of Afro-Colombians) 
but not in others (the indigenous minority groups).  
 
Indigenous people are mentioned in the MAR database as ‘overwhelmingly the victims and not 
the antagonists of the nation’s bloody civil war’.78 While this may be true, it means that the 
armed struggle of MAQL remains invisible throughout the period of mobilization, in this 
particular database.  The view that all indigenous people were victims, does not seem to fit very 
well the more ‘common’ definition of civil war in Colombia, and in general. According to Reid 
Sarkees, the definition of civil war is commonly hinged on two primary criteria.
 79
 The first is the 
threshold of battle-related fatalities of troops in combat, and the second is the status of the armed 
participants in the civil war. The first condition is that between 25 and 1000 battle-related 
fatalities – depending on the database concerned - be recorded within a twelve month period. The 
second requirement for a civil war is that participants on both sides are organized so as to be able 
to inflict casualties. That is, that they have armed forces.  One of the armed forces is usually that 
of the state, and other armed groups may challenges the state within its borders.  The conflict in 
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which the MAQL was involved resulted in casualties, on many sides, and so whilst the MAQL’s 
armed struggle may not fully meet the first criterion, it does fulfil the second, of being an armed 
group able to inflict fatalities.  
 
What, then, is the best methodological option for studying MAQL, as offered by contemporary 
conflict studies around ethnic or identity-based violent conflicts? Contemporary conflict studies 
seem to offer very few options, since almost all identity-based violent conflicts are subsumed 
under the label of “ethnicity”.  Indeed, it is possible to understand indigenous communities as 
“ethnic groups” – and these can be taken as the unit of analysis.  Many elements of the 
indigenous armed and political struggles in El Cauca and the MAQL can be viewed as resulting 
from violent forms of “ethnic conflict”, most of which centre on historically identity-based 
social, economic and political rights, especially in relation to land and culture. The political 
agenda of the MAQL and associated political organizations, especially the CRIC, suggest this. 
They view their opponents both in state forces and institutions, and in other non-indigenous 
groups that encroach on their indigenous land. If these conflicts are relegated to “indigenous 
studies”, they will continue to be perceived as – both theoretically and methodologically – quite 
distinct in kind from the “ethnic” orientation of much quantitative data-based mathematical 
conflict studies.   
 
Yet it is also clear that all identity-based struggles should not be reduced to conflicts around 
“ethnicity”, ignoring relations of race, citizenship, gender and indigenousness, for example.  
With respect to the numbers, the relatively small percentage of indigenous people in Colombia, 
comparatively small size of the MAQL (vis-à-vis FARC and other armed groups) and low battle-
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related fatalities may explain their invisibility in conflict studies and datasets. Perhaps their 
invisibility is logical, then, and even justifiable? None of these options seem quite satisfactory, 
and yet, within currently dominant methodological and conceptual models in conflict studies, 
there seems no other option than to perpetuate a history of ignoring the salience of identity 
conflicts among indigenous groups in Colombia.   
 
What this chapter has tried to expose is how, each time we do research on conflict and peace 
issues, we need to re-engage with a whole set of questions. In the case of Colombia, I have 
discussed how explanations that work at national level may be questionable at regional and local 
levels. I have also raised the issue of the limited nature of quantitative, mathematical modeling 
and methodologies that focus on identifying the causal role of ethnicity in violent conflicts.  The 
need to question the tools of analysis and assumptions of dominant theoretical and 
methodological perspectives seems a given therefore. But the question remains how some 
perspectives become dominant, and how this can prevent us from viewing and recording fully 
the conflict dynamics at local and national level. This question has been considered in much 
more detail, for example, by Kalyvas and MICROCON researchers.
80
  If those engaged in 
conflict and peace studies adopt a methodology or approach less often taken, or not yet taken at 
all, what could this imply for the field of conflict and peace studies, and for claims to the validity 
and reliability of research in these fields?  This chapter has not answered these questions, but has 
tried to show the importance of always analyzing the categories and units of analysis we work 
with.  Of course, in conclusion it is fair to state that the need to think through our methodologies 
and analytical choices is relevant not only for those working in conflict and peace studies with 
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mathematical modelling, but also for those whose mainly qualitative analyses centres on “ethnic” 
definitions of identities.   
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